Before we do so, it would be better to understand that even though the areas of the new strategy may be for the sake of clearer analysis divided broadly into economic, political and defence spheres, in reality they are so intimately related that to think of them in isolation is not only not possible but can lead to harmful results. A great deal of our thinking is in compartments. And because it is in separate compartments, we miss the connections which are so vital for the goals of the republic that I outlined at the beginning. To miss these connections, for example between the kind of strategy we should have for economic development and the need to uphold individual liberty and democratic parliamentary institutions, is to fall into serious error. The history of modern world, particularly since the beginning of the first world war, is, from one point of view, a manifestation of such errors, of which the rise of the so-called National Socialism in Germany was the most monstrous. It is for this reason that we should deal with the economic and the defence aspects as essential parts of the over-all political strategy.
Let us first talk of our defence preparedness, because the territorial integrity of the country should obviously be the first concern of any one who thinks about the future. For a variety of reasons, there is a recognition by the two great powers in the world today of the need for peace and security in West Asia and South East Asia. There is also some understanding that at least in South East Asia, China, with her ambitions of expansion and hegemony, poses a threat to the political stability of this part of the world. The great powers have been canvassing a number of solutions, like the Asian security plan and the like. This thinking is a belated recognition of futility and the irrelevance of military pacts for safeguarding the security of the nations of the region. All this is common-place in international diplomacy today, although when it was pointed out in the early fifties by Nehru, he was dubbed as a communist. The military pacts may go. In fact, both SEATO and CENTO have today become mere caricatures of their former selves. But what will take their place?
This is the question that is now engaging the attention of the political and military strategists of different nations. A complex situation has been made more so by the internal changes in China which have only hardened the outlook of the Chinese leaders. China, therefore, remains a big question mark in the seventies. She may only bark at and not bite the big powers, but one cannot be sure of what she will do in relation to India. It seems that so long as China is not sure of the viability of the social and economic system that she is building, her leaders would continue to look at India with suspicion and hostility and would not be averse to encouraging Pakistan to keep up the tension in the sub-continent.
