The conclusions drawn at the end of the Report flow from examination of all these matters in great detail. In these circumstances I am sure, the House would appreciate that by the very nature of the contents it would not be in the public interest to lay the Report on the Table of the House. Nor is it possible to attempt even an abridged or edited version of it consistent with the consideration of security that would not give an unbalanced or incomplete picture to the House.
I have given deep thought to this matter and it is with great regret that I have to withhold this document from this august house. The publication of this Report which contains information about the strength and deployment of our Forces and their locations would be of invaluable use to our enemies. It would not only endanger our security but affect the morale of those entrusted with safeguarding the security of our borders.
Before I turn to the main conclusions of this Enquiry, may I bring to the notice of the House that I had already made clear that this Enquiry is the type of enquiry which the Prime Minister had in mind when he promised such an enquiry to the House in November 1962, into the state of military unpreparedness to meet the Chinese invasions. I would like to assure the House that we had at the outset made it clear to those who were entrusted with this Enquiry and they in turn made it clear to the persons whom they found necessary to examine, that our main intention was to derive lessons to help in our future preparedness and not in any way undertake a witch-hunt into the capabilities of those who were concerned with or took part in these operations. This is absolutely essential to get a full factual picture of the situation as it obtained in October-November, 1962. I may specially mention this to remind the House that in considering these matters, we should never miss the ‘proper sense of perspective or say or do things which could only give heart to the enemy and demoralise our own men. I have no doubt that the House would wish to ensure this spirit to be maintained.
The enquiring officers submitted .their Report to the Chief of Army Staff on the 12th May 1963. After obtaining some complementary information, the Chief of Army Staff submitted this Report along with his comments to me on the 2nd July. Considering the enormous mass of details that had to he gone into with meticulous care by the enquiring officers, as I have myself seen, I would consider that the Report has been completed with commendable speed.
The first question in the Terms of Reference was whether our training was found wanting.
The Enquiry has revealed that our basic training was sound and soldiers adopted themselves to the mountains adequately. It is admitted that the training of our troops did not have orientation towards operations vis-a-vis the particular terrain in which the troops had to operate. Our training of the troops did have a slant for a war being launched by China. Thus our troops had no requisite knowledge of the Chinese tactics and ways of war, their weapons, equipment and capabilities. Knowledge of the enemy helps to build up confidence and morale, so essential for the Jawan on the front.
